• Authentication
JWT Misconfiguration
JWT misconfiguration covers broken token validation — alg=none, weak secrets, missing exp checks, or accepting tokens signed with the wrong key — that lets attackers forge identity.
How attackers abuse it
Libraries that honor the header’s alg field may accept unsigned tokens (none) or HMAC verification with a public RSA key confused as a secret. Attackers forge admin claims in the payload.
Long-lived tokens without revocation, accepting tokens from other audiences (aud), or skipping issuer checks enable replay across environments.
Secrets committed to repos or default “change-me” HMAC keys make brute-force or direct forgery trivial.
What proof looks like
Proof is a forged or mutated JWT accepted by the API for a privileged action under test — for example alg confusion or stripped signature — with before/after token headers shown (secrets redacted).
In PandaONE, this class maps to the Authentication finding category. Alerts ship only with evidence — never as unverified scanner noise.
How to prevent it
- Pin allowed algorithms server-side; reject alg=none and unexpected algs.
- Validate exp, nbf, iss, aud, and signature with the correct key material.
- Use strong asymmetric keys in production; rotate and store secrets in a vault.
- Keep access tokens short-lived; use refresh rotation and server-side revocation where needed.
- Never embed secrets in mobile/JS clients; treat JWTs as bearer credentials.
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