• Configuration

CORS Misconfiguration

CORS misconfiguration reflects Access-Control-Allow-Origin (and related headers) too broadly — especially with credentials — so hostile sites can read authenticated API responses.

How attackers abuse it

Reflecting the Origin header, using *, or allowing arbitrary subdomains lets evil.example read JSON from your API when a victim visits the attacker page while logged in (if ACAO + ACAC allow it).

Null origin, regex bugs (suffix matching that allows notyourdomain.com), and trusting file:// or sandboxed contexts expand the blast radius.

CORS does not replace CSRF defenses for cookie-auth state changes, but misconfigured CORS is a direct confidentiality break for credentialed XHR/fetch.

What proof looks like

Proof shows a cross-origin request from an unauthorized Origin receiving Access-Control-Allow-Origin for that Origin (often with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true) and a readable response body for a sensitive endpoint.

In PandaONE, this class maps to the Configuration finding category. Alerts ship only with evidence — never as unverified scanner noise.

How to prevent it

  • Allowlist exact origins; avoid reflecting arbitrary Origin values.
  • Never combine Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with credentials.
  • Be careful with subdomain wildcards; prefer explicit production hosts.
  • Separate public unauthenticated APIs from cookie-authenticated ones.
  • Test CORS with real browser credentialed requests, not only curl.

• FAQ

Frequently asked questions

← All vulnerability classes

Hunt this class with proof

Or scan your domain.

Featured on ScrollLaunchFeatured on CodeHype