10-Year-Old NGINX HTTP/2 Flaw Can Let Attackers Run Code Without Login
CVE-2026-123007 has sat in NGINX since 1.9.5 (2015); CVE-2026-123633 adds a second HTTP/2 RCE path on proxies. F5 shipped 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 on November 18, 2026 — here is who found it, who is affected, and what to do today.
A flaw in NGINX’s HTTP/2 stack can let an attacker run code on the server without logging in, as long as HTTP/2 is enabled on the listener. The oldest of the two headline bugs, CVE-2026-123007, has been in open-source NGINX since 1.9.5 (September 22, 2015). Fixed builds 1.31.9 (mainline) and 1.30.7 (stable) landed November 18, 2026, per nginx.org.
Security press including The Hacker News and Wiz Research tracked the story. Wiz (Nir Ohfeld, Tomer Schwartz), Ikotas Labs, Metnir, Rapid7, and Xint all reported issues to F5. Wiz publicly described bypassing ASLR in testing; Xint reported code execution with only a reachable HTTP/2 port. We are not publishing exploit steps or PoC usage — see vendor and research posts for coordinated disclosure context.
Full release matrix (HTTP/3, resolver, mail proxy): NGINX November 2026 patch guide.
The two HTTP/2 RCE-class issues
| CVE | What F5 / researchers describe | What has to be true on your box |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123007 | Memory corruption in HTTP/2 flow control | HTTP/2 enabled (listen ... http2 or http2 on;) |
| CVE-2026-123633 | Use-after-free in HTTP/2 connection handling | HTTP/2 enabled and reverse proxy with requests to backends while worker_connections is under pressure |
F5 scores both 9.2 on CVSS 4.0. Neither flaw lives in your Java, PHP, or Node app — Wiz demonstrated impact on static content with no vulnerable upstream framework.
The same November release fixed three other RCE-class issues that only fire in narrower configs (resolver + SSI/mirror, HTTP/3 proxy, mail proxy). Same patch train — see the advisory roundup.
What “code execution” actually means here
Code reached through these bugs runs as the NGINX worker user, not root. Escalation to root needs another bug (THN notes CIRCL guidance and separate kernel issues in some lab setups). That does not make edge RCE harmless — workers read TLS-terminated traffic, touch upstreams, and often sit in a flat DMZ.
As of the coordinated disclosure window, neither F5 nor the reporting teams described confirmed in-the-wild mass exploitation in the public write-ups THN summarized. CVE-2026-123007 was not listed in CISA KEV at disclosure time — still patch like it will be.
Are you actually on HTTP/2?
HTTP/2 is on when listen includes http2 or http2 on; is set (module docs).
Quick check from a client:
openssl s_client -connect your.host:443 -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | grep "ALPN"
You want to see ALPN protocol: h2 if HTTP/2 is offered. If traffic terminates at a CDN first, test the origin NGINX — an origin that only speaks HTTP/1.1 is not in scope for these HTTP/2 bugs on that hop.
After mitigations, rerun the same command and confirm h2 is gone if you disabled HTTP/2.
Fixed versions (OSS and Plus)
| Branch | Affected (per advisories) | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| Mainline | 1.9.5 – 1.31.8 | 1.31.9 |
| Stable | through 1.30.6 | 1.30.7 |
| NGINX Plus | 37.x before vendor hotfixes; R34–R36 called out in press | 37.0.8.1, 37.3.0.1, plus earlier 37.0.7.1 / 37.2.0.1 for 123633 per F5 |
Official Docker images tagged 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 (including Alpine) were published the same day, per THN’s reporting.
Ubuntu and Debian often lag upstream: distro trackers may still show “vulnerable” while packages catch up. A backported fix may not change the version string from nginx -v — compare your package revision to the distro security notice, not the banner alone.
Fixes, workarounds, and reload traps
Upgrade first. Versions 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 bundle fixes for the full November RCE set, not only HTTP/2.
Restart matters. After upgrade, do a full restart or NGINX binary upgrade. A reload alone can leave the old executable and long-lived workers on vulnerable code until connections drain.
Break-glass (CIRCL-cited pattern, via THN): turn off HTTP/2 until patched:
- NGINX 1.25.1+:
http2 off;in each affectedserverblock; removehttp2fromlisten. - 1.9.5 – 1.25.0: drop
http2fromlisten(e.g.listen 443 ssl http2;→listen 443 ssl;).
Disabling HTTP/2 blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 but not HTTP/3-only or mail-proxy flaws — read nginx.org rows before you treat “h2 off” as done.
Signs that deserve investigation (not proof)
Public guidance (summarized by THN from CIRCL and vendors) mentions:
- Workers spawning unexpected child processes or dying with core dumps
- Long-lived HTTP/2 sessions with heavy ingress but thin access logs (control frames do not always look like requests)
- Odd outbound connects or DNS lookups from worker processes
None of that is a diagnosis by itself — but it is worth a ticket after a disclosure week.
Rapid7’s public technical note (cited by THN) described large HTTP/2 traffic volume and timing constraints on slow links — relevant for threat modeling, not for skipping the patch.
After the edge is patched
Infrastructure CVEs do not replace application testing. On hosts you own and have verified, proof-backed pentest still catches auth, IDOR, and SSRF behind the proxy — AI VAPT with domain verification first.
Read CVEs without score theater: How to read a CVE advisory.